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ARGUMENT
I.

FLORIDA LAW DOES NOT APPLY
A.

The Parties Did Not Agree That Florida Law Would Apply

Contrary to Broward County's assertion, the parties did not agree that Florida law
would, to the exclusion of all other law, govern disputes arising out of the parties'
contract. Indeed, the provision relied upon by Broward County does not even mention
"Florida." This, despite the fact that parties intending to include a choice of law clause
"will usually refer expressly to the state of the chosen law in their contract . . . ."
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 cmt. a (1971) (emphasis added). It is of
particular note that elsewhere, in the very same contract, "Florida" law is, with respect to
certain issues, specifically designated as controlling. E.g., Record at 80, ^ 6 . 1 . Broward
County drafted the contract and all provisions therein, including the purported choice of
law provision. Record at 162, ^ 7-8. As the sole and exclusive drafter of the provision
at issue, Broward County easily could have included appropriate language expressly
providing for a choice of law provision, as it did elsewhere in the contract for other
issues. Broward County's failure to do so precludes any assertion that the clause in
dispute constitutes a valid and enforceable choice of law provision. See generally Zions
First Nat. Bk. v. National Am. Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) (holding that
failure of drafting party to include appropriate language specifically spelling out the
interpretation urged at court by drafting party mandated that provision's ambiguity be
strictly construed against drafter).
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B.

Application of the Relevant Conflict of Law Rules Demonstrate that Utah
Law., Not Florida Law, Governs

The courts are charged with determining which substantive state law will govern in
the absence of an effective choice of law provision. American Nat. Fire v. Farmers Ins.,
927 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1996). In making this determination, the Utah courts have
adopted the "most significant relationship" test as set forth in Section 188 of the Second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws. Id. With respect to disputes arising out of contract, the
relevant factors to be considered are: (1) the place of contracting; (2) the place of
negotiation; (3) the place of performance; (4) the location of the subject matter of the
contract; and (5) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties. IcL; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 (1971).
There is no apparent dispute between the parties regarding the factors that a court must
consider.1 The actual application of those factors to this case is, however, hotly disputed.
Contrary to Broward County's assertions, the relevant conflict of law rules
demonstrate that Utah law, not Florida law, properly governs the parties' dispute.
According to the Restatement, place of contracting is determined according to the place
where the last act necessary to give the contract binding effect occurred. Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 cmt. e (1971). Trillium concedes that this last act

1

However, Broward County has failed to cite a single Utah case that has adopted or
applied sections 191 or 196 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Nor has
Trillium found such a case. Indeed, it appears that, under Utah law, "choice of law" is
determined exclusively according to the test set forth in section 188 of the Restatement.
See American Nat. Fire v. Farmers Ins., 927 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1996).
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occurred in Florida upon defendant's acceptance of plaintiff s offer. However, as stated
in the Restatement, "the place of contracting is a relatively insignificant contact." Id.
The second factor, place of negotiation, is entirely neutral. Contrary to Broward County's
assertion,2 there was no negotiation of any substance whatsoever. Broward County sent a
pre-printed Invitation for Bid to Trillium, Trillium filled out the same and returned it to
Broward County. Record at 162, ^ 4-5. No further negotiation occurred. Record at 162,
^ 6.

The third factor, place of performance, again, contrary to Broward County's

assertion,3 favors Trillium. Indeed, the vast majority of work performed by Trillium
under the contract occurred outside of the boundaries of Florida, and more particularly in
the state of Utah. Record at 162, ^| 10. The actual vehicle modification occurring in
Florida comprised a relatively insignificant portion of the overall work contracted for by
Trillium. Record at 163, ^J 10. Indeed, the actual installation of the conversion kits was
simply the last, of many, responsibilities contracted for by Trillium. See id. The fourth
factor, location of subject matter, also favors Trillium as the relevant inquiry is not where
the goods in question ultimately ended up but rather where the goods originated. See
Rocky Mountain Helicopters v. Bell Helicopter, 24 F.3d 125, 129 (10th Cir. 1994)
(applying Utah rules regarding conflict of laws and holding that Texas law applied
because the subject matter of the contract, a helicopter, originated in Texas). Most, if not

2

Response Brief of Appellee ("Response Brief) at 36.

3

id.
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all, of the parts and components furnished to Broward County were gathered, assembled
and shipped from outside of Florida. Record at 163, ^[ 11. Finally, the last factor,
location of the parties is entirely neutral.4 In sum, only place of contracting, a factor
deemed by the Restatement as insignificant, favors Broward County. Accordingly, the
choice of law factors weigh in favor of application of Utah law, not Florida law.
II.

BROWARD COUNTY CONCEDES THAT THE FLORIDA VENUE
PROVISION DOES NOT APPLY
Broward County now concedes that, regardless as to whether Utah or Florida

substantive law applies, the Florida common law venue provision originally urged by it
does not apply.5 See Response Brief at 36-37. Indeed, it must. Rules regarding venue
are "wholly procedural." Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad v. Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 563 (1967). Under well established Utah law, even
where the law of another state is deemed to be applicable and controlling, the procedural
law of that state, including those provisions regarding the manner and method of bringing
suit, is to be disregarded. Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681, 685 & n.3 (Utah 1981); Records
v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 870 & n.14 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Financial Bancorp v. Pingree

4

Broward County's overreaching is typified by its contention that this factor somehow
overwhelmingly favors Broward County. Broward County is located in Florida, Trillium
in Utah. How Broward County contends that "the relevant consideration" regarding
cc
[t]he domicil [sic], residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of
the parties" (Response Brief at 36) is anything but neutral is mystifying at best.
The purported applicability of the Florida common law venue rule was the exclusive
basis for its Motion to Dismiss. Record at 20-22.
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and Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 16 & n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Accordingly, even were
Florida substantive law applicable, the Florida procedural rule regarding venue would not
apply.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE DISCRETION TO CONSIDER
THOSE ISSUES RAISED BY BROWARD COUNTY FOR THE FIRST
TIME IN ITS REPLY MEMORANDUM
Broward County argues that the trial court possessed the discretion to dismiss this

action based upon those arguments that Broward County improperly raised for the first
time by way of its Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
("Reply Memorandum"). (Response Brief at 28.) According to Broward County, the trial
court's decision to dismiss the action is therefore reviewed under the abuse of discretion
standard. (Id.) Broward County is in error on both counts. Indeed, the two cases cited by
Broward County are not on point. Further, Broward County ignores cases, including Utah
decisions, that are on point and that demonstrate that a trial court may not properly
consider arguments raised for the first time by way of a reply memorandum.
Broward County cites the 1980 Utah Supreme Court decision, Romrell v. Zions
First Naf 1 Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980), for the proposition that a trial court, in
its discretion, may consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply memorandum in
determining whether a motion to dismiss should be granted. (Response Brief at 28.)
However, as Broward County itself candidly admits, the Court in Romrell was speaking
exclusively about its own power to consider issues raised for the first time by way of a
reply memorandum. (Id.) The Court did not consider whether a trial court could order a
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case dismissed based upon issues and arguments raised for the first time in a reply
memorandum. See Romrell, 611 P.2d at 395.
In contrast, more recent decisions, including decisions from within the Utah courts,
have specifically addressed whether a trial court may properly consider issues raised for
the first time by way of a reply memorandum in determining whether to grant a motion to
dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. These decisions demonstrate that a trial court
does not have the judicial discretion to consider such issues.

E.g., State v.

Pathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1003-04 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); White v. Kent Medical
Center, Inc., 810 P.2d 4, 8-9 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). In Pathammavong, the Utah Court
of Appeals specifically determined that a trial court lacked the discretion to consider
issues raised for the first time by way of a reply memorandum when considering whether
a motion to dismiss should be granted. Id. at 1004 ("The Washington court held that the
trial court improperly considered an issue first raised in movant's reply memorandum.
We find the reasoning in White persuasive. Since defendant first raised the issue in his
reply memorandum, it was not properly before the trial court. . . ."). Likewise, in White,
a decision cited with approval in several Utah decisions, the Washington Court of
Appeals determined that a trial court was precluded from considering issues raised for the
first time in a reply memorandum in determining whether a motion for summary

6

The second case cited by Broward County, Boyd v. Davis, 897 P.2d 1239, 1243 (Wash.
1995), completely fails to support Broward County's assertion. In Boyd, the court
determined that it, an appellate court, could consider issues raised in a reply brief because
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judgment should be granted. 810 P.2d at 8-9. As these cases demonstrate, a trial court
does not have the discretion to consider issues raised for the first time by way of a reply
memorandum when considering a motion to dismiss. The authority cited by Broward
County does not command a different conclusion. Accordingly, the trial court below
lacked the discretion to consider those issues raised by Broward County for the first time
in its Reply Memorandum.
Broward County further seeks to defend the fact that it did not raise its arguments
regarding applicability of Utah's venue statutes and comity until its Reply Memorandum
by attempting to establish some sort of tenuous connection between those arguments and
the arguments made by the parties in the two principal memoranda. (Response Brief at
29.)

However, the simple and unassailable fact is that neither party addressed the

applicability of Utah's venue statutes nor principles of comity in any way whatsoever
before Broward County filed its Reply Memorandum.

In essence, Broward County

contends that both the applicability of Utah venue statutes and principles of comity were
somehow implicit or inherent in its original memorandum. However, as stated by the
Washington Supreme Court, "[a] party responding to a . . . motion should not have to
guess what additional issues may be 'inherent' in the motion." R.D. Merrill Co. v.
Pollution Control Bd., 969 P.2d 458, 473 n.10 (Wash. 1999).

a particular Washington rule of appellate procedure specifically and expressly granted the
appellate court the discretion to consider such issues. IdL
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Nor does the fact that Trillium sought leave from the trial court to submit a
supplemental memorandum addressing those new arguments raised by Broward County
serve to somehow excuse the fact that Broward County impermissibly raised new issues
in its Reply Memorandum. Indeed, the record appears to demonstrates that the trial court
never even read the Supplemental Memorandum in Response to Inappropriate New
Arguments Raised by Defendant's Reply Memorandum ("Supplemental Memorandum")
that Trillium attached to its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike. Record at 302,
p. 5, 17-20. Accordingly, it can hardly be said, as Broward County contends, that
"Trillium had—and capitalized on—a full and fair opportunity to address any and all
relevant issues . . . ." (Response Brief at 31.) Further, it is unclear how incorporating
portions of the Supplemental Memorandum into the Brief of the Appellant presented to
this Court somehow serves to retroactively ensure that Trillium was afforded full due
process as Broward County contends. (Response Brief at 31.) The simple fact of the
matter is that Broward County improperly raised new issues in its Reply Memorandum in
violation of established Utah law. To countenance such behavior would required this
Court to overturn established precedent.

The trial court did not have discretion to

consider such issues and Trillium was unfairly denied the due process that it was entitled
to when the court did so.
IV.

UTAH'S VENUE STATUTES DO NOT PRECLUDE BROWARD COUNTY
FROM BEING SUED IN THE COURTS OF UTAH
Despite Broward County's claim to the contrary, Utah's venue statutes do not

prevent it from being sued in the courts of Utah. Indeed, the Utah venue statute relied
357167.1

g

upon by Broward County has exclusive application to suits brought against Utah counties
in the courts of Utah. It simply does not apply to actions brought against counties of
other states.
In interpreting a statute, a court's "primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's
intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Evans v. State, 963 P.2d
177, 184 (Utah 1998). Accordingly, a court is "to look first to the statute's plain
language." Id. A court need not look beyond the language of the statute unless there is
some ambiguity in the statute. Id. "Statutory language is ambiguous if it can reasonably
be understood to have more than one meaning." Id. Indeed, a statute is ambiguous where
each party offers plausible statutory interpretations. Epperson v. Utah State Retirement
BcL, 949 P.2d 779, 783 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("We have long held that 'ambiguous'
means capable of 'two or more plausible meanings.'") (quoting Alf v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993)); Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. Tax Common,
845 P.2d 266, 270 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (stating that statute would be deemed
ambiguous if both parties offered "plausible" interpretations).

"Finally, 'one of the

cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the courts will look to the reason,
spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject matter of
the statute dealing with the subject.'" Moreno v. Bd. of Educ. of Jordan School, 926 P.2d
886, 889 (Utah 1996) (quoting Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464,
466 (Utah 1989)). See also Evans, 963 P.2d at 184 ("[I]f we find a provision ambiguous,
which causes doubt or uncertainty as to its meaning or application, we must analyze the
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act in its entirety and 'harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent
and purpose/'7) (quoting Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge #1743, 854 P.2d 513, 518
(Utah 1993)); Derbridge v. Mutual Protective Ins, Co., 963 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah Ct App.
1998) ("An ambiguous statute must be interpreted in a reasonable way, with an eye
toward the construction that will achieve the best results in practical application [and] will
avoid 'unacceptable consequences/ and will be 'consistent with sound public policy/")
(internal citations omitted).
Section 78-13-3 of the Utah Code provides:
An action against a county may be commenced and tried in such county,
unless such action is brought by a county, in which case it may be
commenced and tried in any county not a party thereto.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3 (1996). Broward County claims that section 78-13-3 applies
not only to suits against Utah counties brought in the Utah courts, but to suits brought
against non-Utah counties as well. (Response Brief at 26-27.) According to Broward
County, section 78-13-3 strictly precludes a Florida county, such as itself, from being
sued in the courts of Utah. (Id.) Broward County, however, failed to cite a single case in
support of this assertion.
Utah courts have not considered whether section 78-13-3 applies to non-Utah
counties. However, courts of other jurisdictions have considered whether similar venue
provisions apply to the municipal entities of non-forum states. In Hansford v. District of
Columbia, suit was brought against the District of Columbia in the state courts of
Maryland. 617 A.2d 1057 (Md. 1993). The District of Columbia moved to dismiss the
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action on the grounds that, under Maryland rules relating to venue, municipal
corporations could only be sued in the county in which they are situated. Id. at 1061. The
District of Columbia argued that the Maryland venue statutes and rules applied not only to
Maryland municipal corporations, but to all municipal corporations of all states. Id.
The Maryland Court of Appeals (the highest court of Maryland) rejected the District of
Columbia's argument, stating:
[A] Maryland municipality, sued in a Maryland court in a transitory action,
should be sued where it is situated. The District of Columbia is not a
Maryland municipal corporation and is not situated in a Maryland county.
In the context of this case, it is a nonresident corporate defendant.
Adoption of the District's argument would lead to the adoption of a venue
rule which would granl foreign municipal corporations the unique privilege
of being immunized from suit in the State of Maryland. The Supreme Court
of Kansas addressed this issue in Hillhouse v. City of Kansas City, 221
Kan. 369, 373, 559 P.2d 1148, 1151 (1977), stating: "there is no sound
reason why a foreign municipal corporation should be treated any
differently from foreign private corporations." We agree with the Supreme
Court of Kansas and hold that a foreign municipal corporation is subject to
the same venue rules as any private corporation.
I d at 1061-62.
Moreover, a review of other Utah statutes relating to counties, as contained in the
Judicial Code (sections 78-1-1 through 78-57-110 of the Utah Code), makes it readily
apparent that the Utah legislature did not intend for section 78-13-3 to apply to suits
against non-Utah counties. For example, section 78-27-14 of the Utah Code provides that
"[w]hen a county is a party and costs are awarded against it, they must be paid out of the
county treasury." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-14 (1996) (emphasis added). The Utah
legislature did not include the "of this State" language that Broward County insists must
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be included to limit a statute's application to Utah counties. (Response Brief at 27.)
Indeed, as argued by Broward County, "the plain wording of the statute applies to ca
county/ Broward County is ca county' within the plain language of the statute just as
much as any county located in Utah." (Id.) Yet clearly, the Utah legislature could not
possibly have meant for section 78-27-14 to apply to Broward County. A contrary
interpretation would, of course, be simply absurd. The Utah legislature would be utterly
devoid of the power to impose such a restriction upon Broward County.

Yet, the

language adopted by the Utah legislature in both sections 78-13-3 and 78-27-14, with
respect to "county," is identical. Accordingly, even assuming, for purposes of argument,
that section 78-13-3 is ambiguous and may, under a forced interpretation, be construed as
applying to foreign counties, such an interpretation must be rejected by this Court as it
would not comport with the clear intentions of the Utah legislature, as evidenced by the
entire context of the Judicial Code. See, e.g., Evans, 963 P.2d at 184 ("[I]f we find a
provision ambiguous, which causes doubt or uncertainty as to its meaning or application,
we must analyze the act in its entirety and "harmonize its provisions in accordance with
the legislative intent and purpose.'") (quoting Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge #1743,
854 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1993)); Moreno v. Bd. of Educ. of Jordan School 926 P.2d 886,
889 (Utah 1996) ("'one of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the
courts will look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire
context and subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject.5") (quoting Mountain

357167 1

12

States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989)).

A contrary

interpretation would simply be out of harmony with the Judicial Code as a whole.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO
DISMISS THE ACTION UNDER PRINCIPLES OF COMITY
Contrary to Broward County's assertion, the trial court did not have judicial

discretion to dismiss this action under principles of comity. Indeed, the Utah legislature
has set forth, by statute, important public policies that have removed the issue from the
realm of comity and judicial discretion. Further, as the trial court was stripped of its
judicial discretion to dismiss the suit under principles of comity, the trial court's dismissal
is not reviewed by this Court under an abuse of discretion standard but rather under a
correction of error standard.
"Comity is the principle that a court, for considerations of public policy, should
defer to a court of another jurisdiction or to a coordinate branch of government and is a
matter that calls for the exercise of judicial discretion." Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d
1142, 1146 (Utah 1991). However, as stated by the Utah Supreme Court, the Legislature
can remove an "issue from the realm of comity and judicial discretion." Id. Indeed, a
court is precluded from invoking comity when to do so would be contrary to established
public policy as determined by the Legislature. IcL

7

Further, whether a county or other form of municipality may be properly subjected to
suit outside of its home county and state is a question of jurisdiction, not venue.
Annotation, Right to Lay Venue of Action Against Municipality in County Other than
that in Which it is Situated, 93 A.L.R. 500, 509 (1934) ("the question whether a
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The Utah Legislature has, by statutory enactment, set forth important public
policies which preclude the extension of comity under the present circumstances. The
Utah Legislature has, by statute, stated:
[that it is] a matter of legislative determination, that the public interest
demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of redress
against nonresident persons, who through certain minimal contacts with this
state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection.
The provisions of [the long arm] act, to ensure maximum protection to
citizens of this state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1996) (emphasis added). This statement of public policy
reflects the conscious and purposeful determination that a Utah citizen is entitled to bring
an action against a non-resident defendant in the courts of Utah when such a suit would
not offend the Constitution. Id Further, it is implicit in the statute that the availability of
redress in the courts of the non-resident defendant's home state is not a sufficient
substitute for the right to bring suit in the courts of the plaintiffs home state.8 Id; see
also Kent County v. Shepherd, 713 A.2d 290, 300 (Del. 1998) (holding that Delaware

municipality can be sued in a state other than that of its situs would appear to be one of
jurisdiction rather than venue....").
In stark contrast to the important public policies inherent in the Utah long arm statute,
venue provisions (such as the Florida provision at issue) which purport to limit where
states or their subdivisions may be sued are enacted merely "to serve the administrative
convenience of the state." Ehrlich-Bober & Co., Inc. v. University of Houston, 404
N.E.2d 726, 730 (N.Y. 1980) (rejecting claims that Texas venue provisions should be
given effect under principles of comity). A state's interests in adherence to venue
restrictions are even weaker where the cause of action arises out of a commercial
transaction. Id, 404 N.E.2d at 731.
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long arm statute ccwas intended to 'avoid the necessity of following a tortfeasor to his [or
her] place of domicile in order to obtain redress for his [or her] tort/") (alterations in
original) (internal citations omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that section 78-27-22 is an express
declaration of important Utah public policy. See Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co.,
701 P.2d 1106, 1110, 1111 (Utah 1985) ("Consistent with that policy declaration
[contained in section 78-27-22], this Court has held that the protection afforded by Utah
courts must be extended to the fullest extent allowed by due process of law." Further
stating, "[t]he legislative mandate is clear.") (emphasis added). Indeed, the important
public policies embodied in section 78-27-22 are of such paramount importance that the
Utah Supreme Court has, on several occasions, decreed that the courts of Utah "must"
exercise jurisdiction over all non-resident defendants to the outermost limits of the
Constitution. Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 1999 UT 50, \ 7, 980 P.2d 204 ("We have held that
the Utah long-arm statute "must be extended to the fullest extent allowed by due process
of law.'") (quoting Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah
1985)); Synergetics, 701 P.2d at 1110 ("Consistent with that policy declaration [contained
in section 78-27-22], this Court has held that the protection afforded by Utah courts must
be extended to the fullest extent allowed by due process of law.").
The important public policies encompassed within section 78-27-22 preclude a
trial court from refusing to exercise jurisdiction, that would otherwise be permissible
under the Constitution, under principles of comity, when the suit is brought by a citizen of
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Utah. Cf Kent County, 713 A.2d at 301 ("The Delaware Long-Arm Statute . . . reflects]
a coherent and comprehensive public policy which prohibits a Delaware Court from
recognizing, as a matter of comity, either the absolute or the limited sovereign immunity
arguments that have been asserted. . . ."). As admitted by Broward County, there is no
dispute as to the fact that it is properly subject to personal jurisdiction in the courts of
Utah. (Response Brief at 18.) Accordingly, section 78-27-22 commanded that the trial
court exercise jurisdiction over Broward County and it erred as a matter of law when it
dismissed Broward County under principles of comity.
A different conclusion is not mandated by the Utah Court of Appeals opinion in
Jackett v. L.A. Dept. of Water and Power, 771 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). To
the contrary, even a cursory review of the decision in Jackett reveals the fallacy of
Broward County's reliance.

In Jackett, the trial court, under principles of comity,

determined that a California statute of limitations would apply and dismissed the action.
Id. at 1075.9 However, the salient facts were quite different from those present here. In
Jackett, the court found that the plaintiff, a California resident, brought the action in
Utah, solely in an attempt to escape the fact that the California statute of limitations had
expired. Id. at 1077. Indeed, the Utah Court of Appeals' decision upholding the trial
court's dismissal was based entirely upon the fact that the plaintiff was a California

9

Of particular note, is the fact that the court did not refuse to exercise jurisdiction over
the California entity, it merely held that the action should be dismissed for the plaintiffs
failure to adhere to the California statute of limitations.
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resident,10 the plaintiff was blatantly engaged in forum shopping,11 and Utah public policy
would not be offended by dismissal.
None of the grounds relied upon by the court in Jackett are present here.13 Most
important of all, is that fact that, unlike in Jackett, Trillium is a Utah citizen. Record at 2,
% 1. As noted above, the Utah Legislature has precluded the Utah courts from refusing,
under principles of comity, to exercise jurisdiction over a suit brought by a Utah citizen
against a non-resident defendant.

Indeed, as noted above, to so refuse to exercise

jurisdiction would offend the clear public policies of the state of Utah. The Jackett court
itself, recognized that comity can not be extended if the public policies of the forum state
would be contravened. Jackett, 771 P.2d at 1076 ("Of primary importance is whether the
public policies of the forum state would be contravened if comity were extended.").

10

"Utah has little interest in litigating this dispute. Mr. Jackett is a California resident
and L.A. Water is a California governmental entity. The fortuitous occurrence of the
crash in Utah is not a compelling reason to accept jurisdiction/' Jackett v. L.A. Dept. of
Water & Power, 771 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
11

"Finally, extending comity in this case prevents forum shopping. Soon after Mr.
Jackett was injured he filed a timely notice of claim as required by California's
Governmental Claims Act. It was only after Mr. Jackett missed California's two-year
statute of limitations, and thus, was foreclosed from suing in California that he filed his
claim in Utah. Allowing Mr. Jackett to pursue his claim in our courts would open the
door to other tardy out-of-state plaintiffs searching for a more favorable forum." Id.
"Thus, the court was applying a statute of limitations consonant with Utah public
policy; such a statute would be applied to Utah governmental entities sued in Utah as well
as California entities sued in California." Id.
"There's no forum shopping here." (Record at 302, p. 21.) It certainly can not be said
that a plaintiff is engaged in forum shopping merely because it desires to bring the action
in the courts of the state in which it resides and pays taxes.
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The trial court below did not have judicial discretion to dismiss this action under
principles of comity.

The authority cited by Broward County does not mandate

otherwise.14 Accordingly, the trial court's decision to dismiss the action was in error and
should be reversed by this Court.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's Order of Dismissal should be reversed. This Court should rule
that Broward County is properly amenable to suit in the courts of Utah. This Court
should remand the action for further proceedings consistent with these rulings.
DATED this IH

day of August, 2000.
r

ERIK A. CHRISTIANSEN
SHANE D. HILLMAN
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Appellant

14

Further, contrary to Broward County's insinuation, the majority of jurisdictions do not
hold that the municipal corporations of other states are immune from suit outside of their
state boundaries. E.g., Hansford v. District of Columbia, 617 A.2d 1057, 1062 (Md.
1993) ("We agree with the majority of jurisdictions which today reject the notion that a
municipal corporation is exempt from the venue principles governing other
corporations."). See also Hillhouse v. City of Kansas City, 559 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Kan.
1977) ("We have concluded that the rule which establishes a special privilege in favor of
foreign municipal corporations so as to exempt them from suit in the court of Kansas is
not in harmony with modern conditions nor does it meet the demands of justice in our
present society.").
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